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EFFECT OF REGULATION ON BANKING: CALIFORNIA 1879-1929 
Lynne Pierson Doti and Richard Runyon 
School of Business and Economics, Chapman University 
ABSTRACT 
California presented a virtually unregulated banking environment 
until the first comprehensive banking regulations were passed in 
1905. The first regulations, and subsequent changes in 1909, 
required reserves and paid up capital. Several tests of commonly 
accepted measures of safety are compared for selected years before 
and after the regulations . These tests include comparison of bank 
reserves, paid up capital, bank failures, and real estate loans that 
resulted in foreclosure . Results of the tests do not clearly 
demonstrate that the safety of individual banks was enhanced, but 
do support the conclusion that the safety of the banking system as a 
whole was enhanced. 
Introduction 
Various theories of bank performance and structure have been tested 
using historical data, which has several advantages over contemporary data. 
Capital markets were more segregated then they are now and, because banks 
and their close substitutes were subject to less regulation and entry restrictions, 
they were freer to respond to market forces, a situation which produced a large 
variety of situations for analysis and comparison. 
Researchers still are trying to determine the effect of regulation on the 
safety of the financial system. The increasing complexity and interdependence 
of the banking systems of various countries led to the beginnings of 
international regulation of banks with the Basel agreements of 1988, and 
further international regulations are forthcoming. However, bank failures 
continue to be a problem in the United States and other countries, and the 
recent failure of the international BCCI proved that the increasing size and ease 
of international transactions may bring even larger problems in banking. The 
question of the effect of regulation on safety has some urgency. 
Money, Credit And Free Banking 
With the generally acknowledged importance of money and credit to the 
performance of the economy, regulation was inevitable. Governments, at all 
levels, sought control. Since banks are the conduit to the economy for both 
money and credit, the banking system became a regulated industry. While 
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probably inevitable, whether this is desirable is an area of controversy. The 
first modem history of U.S. banking, Bray Hammond's Banks and Politics in 
America from the Revolution to the Civil War, was a case for regulation.1 
Even free market advocate Milton Friedman once stated that money creation 
and distribution is an industry that requires regulation. 2 
More recently, some economists have developed the theory that banks 
produce a steadier flow of money and credit without any regulation at all. 
George Selgin, in The Theory of Free Banking, and Lawrence White in Free 
Banking in Britain: Theory, Experience and Debate, 1800-1845, described a 
free banking system where banks issued distinctive notes and deposit accounts 
backed by guarantees to pay gold or silver on demand. Banks competed on the 
basis of acceptability of the payment mechanism, and through longer hours and 
more convenient locations.3 Free Banking: Theory, History, and a Laissez-
Faire Model, by Larry J. Sechrest, suggested that free banking, in the sense of 
allowing banks to be governed only by the market forces, combined with a 
system of fractional gold reserves , provides a system which will satisfy the 
need for a stable flow of money and credit. He suggested that such a system 
will prevent money from being the cause of economic disturbances, provide a 
stable economic environment, and offset major disturbances that arise from 
nonmonetary sources.4 
Free banking, as defined by Secrest, denotes a market-oriented, 
decentralized approach to money. The most obvious features of free banking 
are the absence of any central monetary authority and the issuance of notes as 
well as deposit accounts by individual private banks. s While the term free 
banking has been used to describe the situation in the United States from 1837 
to 1863, in this context the term denotes a situation where banks could be 
chartered simply by meeting certain requirements, but were, in most states, not 
free banking situations as defined by Secrest. In fact, this period, by its lack 
of national bank regulation, spawned a variety of banking regulatory 
environments in the various states. Hugh Rockoff and others have thoroughly 
studied the results of the freedom of this period. 6 
Lawrence White bas done some well noted work on the Scottish 
banking system as an example of a true free banking environment. There 
were, from 1765 to 1844, only a few restrictions on bank behavior. The first 
was unlimited liability for the bank owners. The second was the restriction on 
notes of value of less than one pound sterling and the requirement that banks 
redeem notes for specie immediately when due. 7 Sechrest added the possibility 
that interest rate ceilings were an important restriction, that unlimited liability 
was a barrier to entry and that ultimately, the Scottish banking system was too 
closely tied to the Bank of England to respond freely to market forces. 
Scotland and the Antebellum United States were examined by Sechrest 
as situations that compare to his ideal of free banking. There is however, at 
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least one more. California in the last half of the 19th century conforms very 
well with the model of free banking. 
California Banking 
California from 1879 to 1905 presents a case study of a geographically 
large, economically diverse, rapidly growing economy, with almost no 
regulation of the banking or financial system. 8 The gold rush of 1848 
established gold, traded by weight, as the currency for Californians. In the 
early years, other money still circulated. Gold miners accepted eastern United 
States bills for their gold and gave them limited circulation in anticipation of 
-the fact that they would return to the East after their fortune was made. 9 
However, the isolation from the United States and the fact that many of the 
miners were from other countries meant U.S.paper money was heavily 
discounted, and gold became the currency of choice. 
In spite of the preference for gold, banks opened almost immediately in 
San Francisco and in Sacramento. In 1849, at least six banks operated in San 
Francisco. Most of the early bankers were exchange dealers, offering 
certificates of deposit or other types of notes in return for gold. The early 
banks also offered loans and "borrowed" gold from customers. 10 Notes issued 
by early banks were denominated for as little as 25 cents--the standard price of 
a shot of whisky--equivalent to a pinch of gold dust. 
Throughout the preregulated period, banking in California differed 
from its east coast cousins. Competition was fierce. As White predicts would 
be true for a free banking environment, banks were open long hours, and 
relocated frequently to remain conveniently close to the center of the business 
district. 11 
California Free Banking Era 
The discovery of gold was almost coincident with the cession of 
California to the United States, before any legal system or government was 
established, so laws governing the activities of financial institutions were not 
the result of careful thought and experience. 12 The first legislation relating to 
banking, in fact, was the state constitution. 
Incorporation of banks was the first hotly debated issue at the 
constitutional convention of 1849.13 The majority opinion was that banking 
activities should be limited to private individuals.14 The California 
Constitution, written in haste, was based on the state constitution of Iowa and 
New York, with concessions to the treaty with Mexico. The part relating to 
bank activities in the version submitted to the convention was similar to the 
wording in New York's constitution in prohibiting special legislative 
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charters. 15 However, there was a very strong group, including the prominent 
politician William Gwin, which touted the dangers of allowing banks at all. 
Stirred by personal experiettce, Gwin and others described the evils of paper 
money and wildcat banks. 16 But most delegates, while agreeing to the dangers 
of paper currency, had experienced the disadvantages of gold money and felt 
the ability to deposit gold and receive paper receipts was an indispensable 
practice; and, further believed that it was impossible to prevent the formation 
of banks. The final version of the constitution outlawed paper currency and 
businesses incorporated as banks, and maintained individual liability for 
corporate debt. 17 
After a rash of bank failures in 1855, a law was passed to strengthen the 
injunction against issuing currency. The first offense was a misdemeanor 
bringing a maximum sentence of three months in jail plus a two thousand 
dollar fine. The second offense became a felony which could bring up to five 
years imprisonment. 18 But banking continued to develop, and numerous 
documents exist from the period that are indistinguishable from bank notes. In 
1857, for example, the editor of the Evening Bulletin complained that a local 
restaurant accepted a note on the month-old Brannan Bank "without 
question. "19 At least one San Francisco bank claims to have incorporated 
under the general incorporation laws in 1857,20 and Cross agrees there were 
several incorporated banks by 1860. 21 
In 1862, savings banks were exempted from the 1850 prohibition 
against banking firms and specifically allowed to incorporate. In 1864, 
savings banks with a minimum of $300,000 capital were permitted to carry on 
commercial activities. 22 After 1862, banks freely incorporated under either the 
general incorporation laws or the savings bank incorporation law. 23 These 
incorporation practices played a part in blurring the distinction between 
commercial and savings banks which is an unusual aspect of California's early 
banking system. Both types carried term and ordinary deposits and they 
loaned on similar security. 24 Even the names of the banks often confused the 
distinction. 
The Banking Act of March 1878 was the next attempt to regulate 
bankers. This act created a Board of Bank Commissioners, required all banks 
to pay a license fee, file reports, and be examined twice yearly. Only four 
New England states, Indiana, and Iowa preceded California in the examination 
requirement. 25 In the 1879 revision of the state constitution the banking 
sections were dropped. In 1895, the state required that all banking 
corporations have a minimum capital of $25,000, although it did not have to 
be in the form of cash.26 The same year, the California Supreme Court found 
commercial banks were not forbidden to lend on real estate (a practice they 
were engaging in extensively). 
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The End Of The Free Banking Era In California 
The 1878 California Banking Act was suspended in 1903 and quickly 
replaced with a very similar law which was amended extensively in 1905. The 
1905 act initiated a reserve requirement for commercial banks, made bank 
examination optional for the commissioners, required licenses of private 
bankers, allowed the state to deposit funds in banks and instituted capital 
requirements of $25,000 to $200,000, dependent on city size. This last 
provision was declared unconstitutional and was replaced in 1907 with a 
statute requiring a minimum of $25,000 capital or ten percent of total 
liabilities up to $100,000 maximum.27 
In 1909, the banking law was completely rewritten and the Board of 
Bank Commissioners was replaced with a State Superintendent of Banks. 
Capital requirements were increased and made partially dependent upon 
location. A reserve requirement was initiated and a large number of detailed 
requirements concerning the asset portfolio were written. 28 Unregulated 
banking had become a part of California's history. 
The National Banking System 
While California had a situation very close to Sechrest's free banking 
model, the nation had firmly rejected free banking with the National Banking 
Act of 1863. In the period under study the Federal government was chartering 
banks under the National Banking Act of 1864, while each state chartered its 
banks under widely divergent laws. 
National Banks had minimum capital requirements, note issue restricted 
by the bank's holdings of government bonds, and limits on their lending, with 
specific directions about diversification of their asset portfolio. They were not 
allowed to lend on real estate. The National Bank capital requirement was 
$50,000 until 1900, when it decreased to $25,000 for some rural areas. Note 
issue of National Banks was limited by the requirement that the issue could not 
exceed ninety percent of the par value of bonds deposited with the U.S. 
Treasury, or the capital stock of the bank. The federal tax of ten percent also 
discouraged the issue of state bank notes. The prohibition of loans on real 
estate by national banks formed one of the most characteristic differences 
between state and national banks, although there are indications that national 
banks avoided the impact of this restriction. 29 National banks could not loan 
more than an amount equal to ten percent of its capital stock to any one 
borrower. Reserve requirements were another method of restricting banking 
activity. The national banks' graduated system, which based reserves upon 
location, was duplicated by few states. The national banks required between 
fifteen and twenty-five percent reserves. National banks were required to 
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supply reports on their condition annually and were examined by the 
Comptroller of the Currency. 
California banks quickly and decisively turned up their noses at joining 
the National Banking System. After all, the system explicitly allowed bank 
notes backed by nothing more solid than U.S. Treasury bonds. Local banks 
notes, however illegal they may be, were backed by gold coin. Finally, to 
attract California banks into the system, the first National Gold Banks in the 
United States were opened in California in 1872, after Congress created notes 
payable only in gold coin. 30 Ten banks in California were chartered under this 
provision, but became regular national banks when the laws changed again in 
1879. This same resistance to bank notes meant National Banks did not 
achieve a strong position in California until late in this period. Even by 1900, 
there were only thirty-five national banks in California. 31 
California As A Free Banking System 
Since Sechrest found unlimited liability an impediment to free banking 
in the case of Scotland, he would also offer that it is a barrier to entry in 
California, to the extent that early banks were limited in their ability to 
incorporate until at least 1862. The prohibition against bank notes, which 
appears to be so strict is mentioned nowhere as an inconvenience to the 
bankers of the state. The volume of obligations that circulated gave rise to the 
San Francisco Clearinghouse in 1876 and the Los Angeles Clearing house in 
1877.32 There is, however, considerable evidence of the need to maintain 
public confidence in the banker's products. Even in the 1850s, when rumor 
threatened a bank's solvency, it was common practice for the bank to call in 
unrelated prominent citizens for an audit. 33 
The 1895 capital requirement should have been a barrier to entry. 
However, in 1889 only 11 percent of the banks in the state would not have met 
the $25,000 minimum, even if it were specified as paid in coin. 34 Therefore, it 
seems that from 1878 to 1905, California was very close to the model of a free 
banking environment. 
Having identified a situation that may serve as a real world example of 
a free banking system that then turned into a mildly regulated system, we now 
have an opportunity to determine whether the banking system worked better 
unregulated or regulated. 
Tests Of The Effect Of Regulations 
Frequently used measures of safety in the banking system today include 
adequate capital, adequate reserves and a small number of banks failing. 
Presumably, if regulation improves safety of the system, capital of banks will 
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rise, reserves will increase, fewer bad loans will be a part of the bank 
portfolio, and less failures will occur. Other factors may affect these factors, 
however. If regulation is perceived to increase the safety of the banking 
system, in fact it will. If bank runs are less frequent, banks would not need to 
have high capital or high reserves. For example, post-FDIC reserves and 
capital are far lower than the figures encountered in the early years used for 
this study. The capital ratio for all U.S. banks today is less than 10 percent, 
and would be much less than that without the regulators' insistence of high 
minimum capital ratios. 35 However, given the difficulty of gathering data for 
tests, these common measures of safety are used to determine whether safety 
increased after California's banking system went from an essentially free 
banking environment to a regulated environment. 
Data On California Banking 
The only information available on banks for the free banking period in 
California is the Board of Bank Commissioners' reports, which includes data 
on all incorporated and some private commercial and savings banks. Not 
anticipating the future statistical analysis of these reports, the Board put little 
emphasis on consistency. After the Board of Bank Commissioners was 
authorized to examine the state banks in 1878, they published balance sheets 
that had been provided individually by the banks. Throughout most of the free 
banking period, there were two statements per year, one of which was 
reviewed by the Board (it is not always clear which one). Mostly the dates of 
the reports are December 31 or January 1 and July or August. The reports for 
1881, 1892, 1898, and 1901-1904 were never published. 
Due to these inconsistencies and difficulty of gathering data, the tests 
are run with a sample taken at five year intervals before and after the 
regulation is in place. This conveniently avoids dealing with most of the 
missing data, while using a pattern that includes years the census data was 
gathered. Since 1904 is not available, however, 1905 was substituted. While 
the law was changed in 1905, a lag is assumed before new regulations had an 
effect. The laws were changed further in 1907, and in 1909 were entirely 
rewritten. 1910 is used as the first year of the regulated environment The 
summer date is used for each year, since all the master spreadsheets prepared 
by the commissioners are available. This data is mostly July or August for the 
pre-regulation years and June after regulation. The switch of months may bias 
the results, since California was primarily an agricultural state during the 
entire period 1878 to 1929, and the pattern of harvest and planting may have 
affected the tests. 
These tests may have been affected by other factors. The state grew 
rapidly throughout the late 19th and early 20th century, in wealth and in 
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population. The number of banks in the state increased rapidly also, from 496 
banks in 1905 to 678 in 1910.36 Most of the growth in the 1905 to 1910 
period was in the southern part of the state. Because of the rapid changes of 
the period, a large number, in fact, most, of the banks open in 1910 were new 
banks. 
Capital Ratio Test 
One currently used measure of the safety of the banking system is the 
amount of capital as a ratio of assets in a bank. If regulation made banks 
stronger, one symptom should be an increase in the capital ratio. The laws 
passed in 1905-1909 included a minimum capital paid in (coin or legal tender) 
of $25,000 for all banks, and required larger capital--up to $200,000--for 
larger banks. 37 
The individual ratios for all the banks in existence in 1905 were 
compared with the ratios of all the banks in existence in 1910, using t-test for 
difference in mean. Results appear in Table 1. The mean ratio shows a 
decrease from almost 30 percent to 23 percent, significant at the 90 percent 
level of confidence. This result does not conform to increased safety of the 
banks. To learn more of the possible causes for this result, the capital of 
individual banks that were in existence both in 1905 and in 1910 was 
compared. Their capital ratios were lower than the average for all banks in 
1905, and declined less between 1905 and 1910. Therefore, the large number 
of new banks and the fast growth of southern California may have been the 
source of lower capital held by banks. 
Table 1 
Capital Ratio 
Capital/asset ratio 190! 
For all banks 29 .6% 
For same banks 24 .0% 
1910 
22 .6% 
22 .5% 
significant difference 
yes 
no 
From Table 2, it appears that the capital ratio was decreasing from 1879 
to 1924. No sharp decrease occurs between 1905 and 1910. 
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Table 1 
Capital Ratio Test 
Year Total Capital ($) Total Assets($) Ratio(%) 
BEFORE REGULATION 
1879 48.182.242 .11 126.154,788.20 38.19 
1884 46 ,623 ,194.99 149.871 ,640.03 31.10 
1889 63.773,018 .60 215 ,450,686.83 29 .60 
1894 74 .712 ,213 .90 264.733.280.50 28.22 
1899 50.678.042.22 297.356.526.39 17.04 
190! 86,028,747.42 510,943,513 .26 16.83 
AFTER REGULATION 
1910 88.302,441 .08 560.192.077.56 15 .76 
1914 94 .034.528.05 706,794,715 .30 13 .30 
1919 107,391 .841 .66 1.121.669.176.52 09 .57 
1924 197,544,925 .64 2.216,087 ,260. 76 08.91 
Reserves 
If capital was systematically declining, perhaps the reserves on hand 
were increased by the reserve requirement initiated in 1905. Only commercial 
banks were affected by the 1905 requirement of a 15 to 20 percent reserve 
(again, depending on location). 38 Up to one-half of the reserves could be kept 
on deposit at another bank, so reserves here include cash on hand and due from 
other banks. In fact, the requirement of reserves should increase the reserve 
ratio, ceteris paribis, because, presumably, these required reserves were no 
longer available to the bank to tide the bank over a run. 
Again the ratios for all the banks in existence in 1905 were compared 
with the banks in existence in 1910. AB shown in Table 3, there were declines 
in the reserve ratio from 25 percent to 18.5 percent. The comparison showed a 
difference in the mean ratios of reserves to assets significant at the 90 percent 
level. With banks that existed before and after the changes in regulation, the 
reserve ratio declined from 20 percent to 19 percent, a decline for the 215 
banks that is not significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. 
Paid iD raenesiiSidS 
For all banks 
For same banks 
TableJ 
Reserve Ratios 
1905 
24 .8" 
20.2" 
159 
1910 
18.5" 
19.0" 
sipilkaat at 90, 
yes 
no 
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The reserve ratio declines also seem to be part of a long run trend, • 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 
Reserve Ratio Test 
Total Total Assets($) 
Reserves($) 
BEFORE 
REGULATION 
1879 24 .302,901.73 126, 154,788.20 
1884 19.980,028 .35 149.871 ,640.03 
1889 30,981,728.33 215.450,686 .83 
1894 41.180.256 .87 264 ,733 .280.50 
1899 47 ,330.502.46 297,356,526.39 
1905 82 ,350,656.55 510,943,513.26 
AfTER 
REGULATION 
1910 77 .890,708.29 560,192,077.56 
1914 94 ,983 .516.79 706,794,715 .30 
1919 162 .778.998 .36 1,121,669,176.52 
1924 279.966.565 .61 2.216,087 ,260. 76 
1929 191.228.923 48 1.730,987,456.33 
Reserve Ratio(%) 
19.26 
13 .33 
14.38 
15 .55 
15 .91 
16.11 
13.90 
13 .43 
14.51 
12.63 
11.04 
Again it appears that a long run decrease in the reserve ratio is 
occurring, and that it is hard to make a case that the change in law which 
inaugurated reserve requirements caused a systemic increase in reserves. 
Other Real Estate Owned 
Modem bankers know the term OREO well, and it does not give rise to 
thoughts of milk. OREO refers to •other real estate owned•--other than the 
bank premises. It is a real indicator of the problems California bankers have 
because of the heavy lending for real estate. Weather has always been one of 
the state's strongest resources. For the early years good weather brought 
expansion of farm land; later it brought tourists, and always it brought new 
settlers who wanted land. California commercial and savings banks both 
always had a large proportion of real estate mortgages in their portfolio. 
When the mortgages in the portfolios tum to actual real estate owned because 
of defaults on those mortgages, banks are in trouble. To see if the proportion 
of real estate owned feU after regulation, that part of the balance sheet is 
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compared to total assets of the commercial and savings banks. Comparison of 
individual bank's ratios for 1905 and 1910 yields the same results. There is a 
decrease in the ratio of other real estate owned between banks in 1905 and in 
1910 that is significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. To see if this is 
also part of a long run trend, several years of ratios were calculated. The 
results are shown in Table 5. 
TableS 
Other Real Estate Owned 
OREO Total Assets OREO 
Ratio 
BEFORE 
REGULATION 
1879 4,851 ,2 16.47 126.154.788. 20 3.84 
1884 5,2 17,056.46 149.871 ,640.03 3.48 
1889 3,569,608 .12 215.450,686.83 1.65 
1894 5,240.724.67 264,733 ,280.50 1.98 
1899 17,689,042 .12 297 ,356,526.39 5.94 
1905 9,931 ,165 .56 510,943 ,513 .26 1.94 
AFTER 
REGULATION 
1910 4,479,965 .48 560,192,077.56 0.80 
1914 4,598,114.92 706,794,715 .30 0.65 
1919 8.535 ,904. 79 1.069.043 ,893 .77 0.79 
1924 9,708,904.94 2.295 ,478 .468 .49 0.42 
1929 6,659 ,295 .29 1.730.987,456.33 0.38 
It appears that the regulations have had an effect. Banks are either more 
careful in their lending on real estate, or foreclosures decreased for other 
reasons. The latter possibility cannot be dismissed, since this later period 
corresponds with very rapid growth of the state. 
Failure Test 
Perhaps the new regulatory environment inspired public confidence in 
the banking system which resulted in less loss through bank failure. To test 
this, the assets of the banks that were being liquidated at the reporting time 
were compared with the total assets of the banks reporting. The results are 
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shown in Table 6. 
Table 6 
Assets of Failed Banksffotal Assets of All Banks 
Year 
1879 
!884 
1889 
1894 
1899 
1905 
1910 
1914 
1919 
1924 
Failed Banks' Assets($) Total Bank Assets ($) 
BEFORE REGULATION 
No Bank Failures Reported 0 
3.711.543 .88 149,874,750.03 
792 ,215 .85 246,511.972.41 
8.312.606 .17 294 ,561.657.21 
1.646.473 .25 302,415 ,454 .84 
2,189,593 .33 454,347 ' 183 .24 
1.530, 739.08 
1.234.779.89 
838 ,708 .14 
186,120.10 
AFTER REGULATION 
568,014,739.37 
745.221 ,699 .08 
1,079,294,216.63 
2,309,196,826.04 
Failed Asset Ratio(%) 
2.47 
0.32 
2.82 
0.54 
0.48 
0.26 
0.16 
0.07 
0 
This test yields some visible results that seem to indicate that regulation 
reduced the amount of assets affected by bank failure. After regulation, the 
assets of banks in liquidation fell dramatically, while the assets of the state's 
banking system grew rapidly. Unfortunately, confidence in the results are 
marred by the change in format of the report on banks in liquidation in 1929, 
and the frightening rate of bank failures that commenced in the following year. 
Condusiom 
Neither the reserves of banks nor the paid in capital of banks appear to 
have increased when California went from an essentially free banking 
environment to a conventionally regulated environment, even though the 
regulations specifically addressed these two issues of safety. The evidence 
does not support the contention that regulation will strengthen the banks. Yet 
two other measures of safety of the system indicate that regulation may have 
strengthened the system as a whole. The amount of assets in banks being 
liquidated and the amount of real estate owned by banks both dropped 
significantly after regulation. There are several possible reasons for the 
inconsistent results. Most obviously, the banking measures are taken in 
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isolation from the other factors in the economy. All four of the test results are 
consistent with overall strengthening of the California economy. Banks in a 
healthy, growing economy do not need large amounts of capital or reserves, 
and have opportunities to invest the funds profitably. Bank failure and real 
estate foreclosure would also decrease if the economy experienced 
improvement over the period studied. While there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that the economy grew in this period, there is little hard data available 
to incorporate into the tests. 
While the regulations on capital and reserves did nothing to increase the 
banks' ratios and make them individually safer, the regulations may have 
improved public confidence in the banking system and reduced the failure rate. 
This, however, would not have improved the "Other real estate owned" 
category. It seems more likely that all the test results are reflecting a rapidly 
improving economy in California over this time period. 
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